The optimal mean photon number (µ) for quantum cryptography is the average photon number per transmitted pulse that results in the highest delivery rate of distilled cryptographic key bits, given a specific system scenario and set of assumptions about Eve's capabilities. Although many experimental systems have employed a mean photon number (µ) of 0.1 in practice, several research teams have pointed out that this value is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, various optimal values for µ have been described in the literature.
Background and Problem Statement
It now seems likely that Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques can provide practical building blocks for highly secure networks, and in fact may offer valuable cryptographic services, such as unbounded secrecy lifetimes, that can be difficult to achieve by other techniques. Accordingly, a number of commercial and research organizations have begun to build and operate complete QKD systems. As quantum cryptography has started the transition from laboratory demonstrations to working systems in the field, questions of operating efficiency 1 and realistic levels of security have taken on a heightened importance. a A wide range of techniques has been proposed for quantum cryptography, and many have been experimentally demonstrated; see Gisin et al. [1] for a superb overview. However, in realistic settings, such as operation through the atmosphere or through tens of kilometers of telecommunications fiber, even the most efficient of these techniques currently provide no more than roughly 1,000 distilled b bits per second, depending on channel losses, choice of eavesdropping threat model, and a large number of technical parameters. While this key generation rate is more than sufficient for rapid rekeying of conventional cryptographic algorithms-for example it allows rekeying of an AES algorithm with fresh 256-bit keys 4 times per second-a faster key generation rate would allow a large number of cryptographically protected traffic flows to be rekeyed at a given rate. In addition, it is far too low for most uses of one-time pads. An important practical question, therefore, is how to increase this rate.
A number of different approaches may contribute to improved distilled key generation rates: detector efficiencies may be improved, e.g., by novel forms of detectors; pulse rates may be increased; and entropy estimates may be refined so that less privacy amplification is required for a given observed level of noise. Promising efforts are underway in all these areas (e.g. [2, 3, 4] ). This paper explores yet another avenue to increasing the key generation rate, namely, by finding an optimal value for the mean number of photons emitted in each pulse, i.e., that which maximizes the distilled key generation rate for a given scenario and set of eavesdropping assumptions. This mean photon number is often designated µ in the QKD literature.
This paper provides a detailed, quantitative analysis of the interaction between µ, channel attenuation, and privacy-amplified key generation rates, and compares the results with prior research on optimal mean photon number. We specifically consider a phase-modulated system, with attenuated laser source and cooled InGaAs APDs, designed for telecommunications fiber; however the results can be readily generalized to other systems.
One interesting result is that µ ≈ 1.1 is optimal for a wide range of realistic, fiber-based QKD systems under a reasonable eavesdropping threat model; in fact, it provides nearly 10 times the distilled throughput of systems that employ a more conventional µ = 0.1, without any adverse affect on system security. For many steeped in the field, it may seem counterintuitive-even downright false-that a mean photon number as large as 1, let alone greater than 1, may be possible without sacrificing all security. However, as Prof. Gisin et al. have noted in their magisterial survey of quantum cryptography [1] , "multiphoton pulses do not necessarily constitute a threat to key security, but they limit the key creation rate because they imply that more bits must be discarded during key distillation." This paper may be viewed as an elaboration, and preliminary quantification, of that important remark.
Review of the Current Art
Although most practitioners of quantum cryptography have now converged upon a mean photon number (µ) of 0.1 as a good benchmark value, "contrary to a frequent misconception, there is nothing special about a µ value of 0.1, even though it has been selected by most a The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Defense, DARPA, or the United States Air Force. b In our terminology, a "distilled" key has been sifted, error corrected, and privacy amplified, and is thus ready to use as key material.
experimentalists. The optimal value-i.e., the value that yields the highest key exchange rate after distillation-depends on the optical losses in the channel and on assumptions about Eve's technology." [1] In fact, in recent years, at least three leading research teams have carefully investigated the optimal mean photon rate, and have come to differing conclusions. Accordingly, this section recapitulates both the widespread rationale for µ = 0.1, and the previous research on the relationship of µ to distilled key rate.
As will be seen, for some years the QKD community has held, in effect, an ongoing discussion of the optimal mean photon number for various contexts, but generally as side comments within papers devoted to other topics. As a result, it has been difficult to find a detailed and explicit linkage between eavesdropping threat models and optimal mean photon numbers.
The origin of the value 0.1 for the mean photon number was the very first experimental realization of QKD by Bennett et al. in 1992 [5] . This early work analyzed various kinds of attacks on the small number of multi-photon pulses produced, including one version of unambiguous state discrimination, and concluded that unambiguous state discrimination was impossible for such a small µ without significantly biasing the detector statistics at Bob. Later researchers have shown that this conclusion is incorrect [6] . However, the number of bits that Eve can discover is very small, and Bennett et al. left a significant safety margin in their estimate. The attacks they considered feasible involved intercepting one photon from each multi-photon pulse and measuring it. For each such pulse that reaches Bob, they assume Eve gains one bit of information, thus implicitly allowing Eve to have a quantum memory and to measure the photon only when its basis is disclosed.
Many other experimental systems, including ours, borrowed from [5] the value of 0.1 for µ as well as the estimate of Eve's advantage from photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks. Two experimental teams, from Los Alamos [7] and IBM Almaden [8] , then calculated optimal numerical values for µ in their systems, based on this estimate. For the free-space system used by Los Alamos, this value of µ was 0.4, while for IBM's "plug-and-play" fiber-based system it was 0.3. The IBM Almaden group also examined the throughput vs. mean photon number for a number of different eavesdropping models.
On the theoretical side, Gilbert and Hamrick [6] performed an extensive analysis of possible attacks on multi-photon pulses, including splitting, unambiguous state discrimination, and surreptitiously replacing the channel to Bob with a perfectly transparent one. In short, they selected a more formidable eavesdropping model than posited in the analyses of Bennett, Los Alamos, or IBM Almaden. Granting Eve such powers, they produced a much more conservative estimate of the amount of information Eve might gain. They also analyzed the optimum mean photon number in one specific scenario, an aircraft to a LEO satellite, and found it to be 0.455, although in this case they allow Eve less power than in a fiber link-specifically, she is not able to replace the channel with a lossless one.
These differing estimates are further compared in section 5.
Our Analytical Approach
Our analysis, in the following section, is derived from a moderately detailed mathematical model of a full QKD system for use in telecommunications fiber, including both physical effects and the outcomes of higher level protocols, validated against two working systems in the laboratory. This section briefly describes our working systems (the concrete subjects of analysis), then discusses the major elements in our analytic model. Appendix A contains the full text of the model.
Functioning Systems for Quantum Cryptography
BBN, Boston University, and Harvard University are currently building a large-scale quantum cryptography system, the DARPA Quantum Network, and fielding it into dark fiber in the Cambridge, Massachusetts metropolitan area. See for example [9, 10] for details on this network and its design goals. Two interoperable QKD systems in the DARPA Quantum Network started 24x7 duty in October 2003; we call these 'Mark 2' systems because they replaced our first-generation link, which started continuous operation in December 2002. These systems were inspired by a pioneering Los Alamos system [11] and designed to run through telecommunications fiber as widely deployed today. Each Mark 2 system employs a highly attenuated telecommunications laser at 1550.12 nm, phase modulation via unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and thermo-electrically cooled InGaAs avalanche photo detectors (APDs). Most Mark 2 electronics are implemented by discrete components such as pulse generators. At present, incoming dim pulses are detected by Epitaxx EPM 239 AA APDs cooled to approximately -40 degrees Centigrade and gated during a pulse arrival period. Since custom cooling and electronics are required, we designed and built our own cooler package to maintain the APDs at the requisite operating temperatures. Even with this special treatment, they suffer considerably from low Quantum Efficiency (QE), relatively high dark noise, and serious after-pulsing problems. These cooled detectors form one of the most important bottlenecks in the overall system performance, as they require on the order of 10 µsec to recover between detection events. The overall link has been designed to run at up to 5 Mb/s transmit rate but with a dead-time circuit to disable the APD after a detection event in order to accommodate this recovery interval and suppress detector after-pulsing.
BBN's QKD protocol stack is an industrial-strength implementation written in the C programming language for ready portability to embedded real-time systems. At present all protocol control messages are conveyed in IP datagrams so that control traffic can be conveyed via an internet. Two aspects of BBN's QKD protocol stack deserve special mention. First, it implements a complete suite of QKD protocols. In fact, it implements multiple "plug compatible" versions of some functions, e.g., it provides both the traditional BB84 sifting protocol and the newer "Geneva" style sifting [12] . It also provides a choice of entropy estimation functions including the well-known BBBSS92 estimates [5] , Slutsky's defense frontier analysis [13] , and the newer Myers-Pearson estimate [4] . We expect to add additional options and variants as they are developed. Second, BBN's QKD protocols have been carefully designed to make it as easy as possible to plug in other QKD systems, i.e., to facilitate the introduction of QKD links from other research teams into the overall DARPA Quantum Network.
Analytic Tools used in this Paper
Over the past two years, we have developed a Matlab / Octave model to analyze the expected efficiency of current and projected fiber-based QKD systems in the DARPA Quantum Network. The complete model is provided in Appendix A. Some aspects of the model have been derived from the QKD literature, but most have been developed from first principles. This model provides for a wide range of input parameters such as pulse rate, mean photon number at Alice, attenuation, detector efficiency, dark count, and after-pulsing characteristics, residual phase error in the Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and so forth. It also provides input parameters for higher layers of the QKD protocol stack, such as the sifting protocol employed, information revealed during error detection and correction, entropy estimation technique, etc. We briefly discuss these inputs, and the associated calculations, in the following paragraphs. Although the model provides basic estimates for a range of physical and protocol phenomena, it is by no means complete. For example, it does not include any characterization of stray light, of chromatic or polarization mode dispersion, and so forth. However, the current version of this model has been validated against our QKD systems running both through a fiber spool in the laboratory and through a 17km fiber loop between BBN and Harvard University, and its results agree well with experimental measurement. Thus it appears to capture at least the most important drivers for realistic system behavior.
As shown in Appendix A, the model inputs represent a fiber-based system with a 5 Mb/s pulse rate, 0.1 mean photon number (µ), operating through 10.55 km of telecommunications fiber with an overall fiber attenuation of 2.5 dB. The average receiver loss factor is 10.4 dB, with a residual phase error in the Mach-Zehnder interferometers of 3 degrees after both passive and active path length stabilization. The path length stabilization and framing overhead results in a duty cycle of 80% for usable QKD bits. Detector efficiency is 13%, with missteered light occurring in 0.9% of the detections, and a dark count probability of 2.8 × 10 −5 per pulse. At higher layers of the QKD protocol stack, the traditional BB84 sifting algorithm is modeled, with the BBN variant of the Cascade error detection and correction protocol using a block size of 4,096 bits with 64 sets, the traditional BBBSS92 [5] entropy estimate, and a residual confidence level (the probability that Eve has more information than estimated) of 10 −6 . These values capture the current state of our QKD systems as of January 2004. It should be apparent from inspection of Appendix A that these parameters can be readily adjusted to model other fiber-based systems, e.g., different detector characteristics, protocol behavior, and so forth. One could also extend the model to free-space systems, or systems based on pairs of entangled photons, but this would require that additional equations be added to the model rather than mere adjustment of input parameters.
Eavesdropping Model and Defense Function
The most critical factor driving an optimal choice of mean photon number is determining what sort of attacks Eve can employ. For intercept-resend attacks on the single-photon pulses, there is a fairly well-developed theory about how much privacy amplification is necessary [13, 4] . For multi-photon pulses, a number of possible attacks have been proposed and analyzed [6, 14, 15] , but it is by no means clear that the list of possible attacks is complete yet [16] . Many of the theoretically possible attacks are very far from practical implementation with current technology.
Note that these assumptions about Eve's abilities must be built into the privacy amplification margin used in any working QKD system, so they are by no means idle questions. If one wishes to deploy QKD securely, one must choose these assumptions carefully. Once we have chosen these assumptions and the privacy amplification formula, numerical optimization techniques can determine the optimal multi-photon probability. Therefore it is useful to explicitly list a set of assumed capabilities for Eve for a given scenario, as the rates vary greatly depending on the assumptions.
We must decide, for example, whether we wish to guard against an Eve possessing the capabilities listed in Table 1 . Many research results assume that Eve possesses all these capabilities; for some papers it is difficult to determine exactly which capabilities are assumed. Adaptive beam-splitters, which split at most one photon from the signal [16] Reliable quantum non-demolition measurement of the total number of photons
The ability to perform unambiguous state discrimination on pulses with 3 or more photons
The ability to discriminate multi-photon pulses in intercept/resend attacks [1] The ability to substitute low or zero-loss fiber, or to perform quantum teleportation with small loss It is our belief, following Gisin, et al. [1] , that it is reasonable to guard against eavesdropping that is currently feasible, or may be in the not-too-distant future, rather than make deployment infeasible by attempting to guard against theoretical attacks that may never be possible. Note, in particular, that near-perfect detectors, particularly if they can resolve the number of photons in a pulse, adaptive beam-splitters, or quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements can all give us a reliable way to build a true single-photon source, which would, in turn, render PNS attacks harmless. QKD is very likely to shift to true single-photon emitters long before we need to worry about an eavesdropper with a long-term quantum memory. It is one of the greatest virtues of QKD that, unlike classical cryptography, there is no risk that a future powerful adversary endangers our communications in the present. Accordingly, the check marks in Table 1 indicate which technology we assume Eve has for the purposes of this analysis, and for the current operation of our working QKD systems. We believe that these assumptions are reasonable for current scenarios, since many of the postulated technologies appear to be beyond today's current state of the art.
Finally, given this explicit set of assumptions about Eve's current capabilities, one must select an entropy estimate used as input for privacy amplification. This entropy estimate includes Eve's information from intercept-resend attacks, called by Slutsky et al. the "defense function" [13] . Here we use results based on the original entropy estimate in BBBSS92, but our analytic model explicitly calculates three different entropy estimates (BBBSS92 [5] , Slutsky [13] , Myers-Pearson [4] ). The choice of optimal mean photon number is very similar for all choices of entropy estimate.
Results and Discussions
Given all these assumptions, we can employ an analytic model (Appendix A) to calculate the optimal mean photon number (µ) over a range of scenarios. Recall that the "optimal" value is that which maximizes the delivery rate of distilled bits / second, i.e., optimizes across the system-wide effects of multi-photon emission probabilities, attenuation, dark noise, sifting, bits revealed during error detection and correction, and the necessary amount of privacy amplification.
The model allows us to extrapolate system performance in a number of scenarios, e.g. if we had longer fibers, a faster pulse rate, or better detectors. In particular, we can analyze the effects of changing the mean photon number. In Figure 1 we vary only the mean photon number µ, with all other parameters derived from one of our current QKD systems (with 10.55 km of optical fiber between Alice and Bob). It is very apparent that the current mean photon number µ, approximately 0.1 photon, is far from optimal in this setting. Instead the mean photon number µ should be slightly more than 1 (about 1.15) to achieve the optimal distilled key rate. Another major objective in optimizing µ is to maximize the distance available for practical QKD over metropolitan fiber. Figure 2 shows how the distilled key rate varies with both fiber length and µ, again given specific system characteristics (Appendix A) and the eavesdropping model of Section 4.
As can be seen, the distilled key rate falls off dramatically with distance, and requires high values of µ for long distances. These specific results are driven by the relatively low quantum efficiency, and relatively high dark count, of our current InGaAs detector suite, but the phenomenon is more general. Larger µ naturally leads to more photons at the receiver, and correspondingly more raw key bits per second, but more importantly it keeps the valid detect rate high compared to receiver dark noise. Dark noise with a highly attenuating channel decreases the distilled rate in a very dramatic way because it translates directly into a higher error rate. The error detection and correction protocol, such as Cascade, then must reveal a substantial amount of information to correct the errors. Since it must be assumed, conservatively, that all these errors are due to eavesdropping, the estimate of the remaining entropy in the bits drops sharply. Since many factors affect the distilled key rate, it is not surprising that there is not a single optimum value of µ to employ in all scenarios. However, for our systems, the optimum value does not vary by much. Figure 3 shows the optimum µ for distances from zero to 50 km. The optimum varies by less than 20%, from about 1 to 1.2. The peak of the key rate curve (Figure 1 ) is rather broad, so choosing a value of 1.0, say, for µ seems to be applicable for a broad range of operating conditions.
Since our estimates of the optimal mean photon number are quite different from conventional wisdom, careful review of the assumptions and calculations is in order. We believe that Bennett, Los Alamos, IBM Almaden, and this paper all employ similar eavesdropping models. This is important, because the eavesdropping threat model drives the calculations of optimal mean photon number.
The main difference in our calculation from those of Los Alamos is as follows. They used, following Bennett et al., a fairly rough estimate for the fraction of detected pulses that are vulnerable to splitting. Bennett's (intentionally conservative) estimate was that Eve could learn a fraction µ of the bits through beamsplitting. This obviously would never allow µ = 1, since then Eve would learn all of the bits. But this is quite conservative indeed, since the fraction m of non-empty pulses that contain multiple photons (all of which we want to assume Eve intercepts) may be more precisely estimated by the Poisson distribution,
This fraction m is close to µ/2 when µ is small, but diverges farther from µ at higher values. Figure 4(a) shows the effect of this difference between the estimates on distilled key rate for the specific scenario depicted in Figure 1 . The estimate we use throughout this pa-
where m is defined above, and c = 10 −6 is a confidence parameter, the residual probability that Eve might gain more information from multi-photon pulses. The original BBBSS92 [5] estimate ("original Bennett") is identical except for using m = µ.We are not the first to employ this revised estimate. Both Lütkenhaus [17] and Gilbert and Hamrick [6] derive their results with the correct multiphoton Poisson statistics, and indeed predict that for low loss and high efficiency detectors, the optimum efficiency is achieved for mean photon numbers greater than 1. Without much discussion, the IBM Almaden results [8] included curves for the "revised Bennett" estimate as well as the "original Bennett" estimate for a range of detector efficiencies and channel losses, in a most interesting graph of the effect of µ on distilled key rate in other eavesdropping models, including those of [6] and [17] . These graphs showed that under some circumstances µ > 1 is optimal in these other models.
Figure 4(b) shows the effect of using Gilbert and Hamrick's estimate [6] , based on a more severe eavesdropping model. Since they allow Eve perfect unambiguous state discrimination attacks and zero-loss fiber, it is not surprising that their estimate results in a far lower key rate. The threat model treated in this paper has been implicitly assumed in the eavesdropping estimates for multi-photon pulses provided by other research teams [5, 7, 8] . We believe it is a plausible threat model, given current technology. It is, however, important to realize that with larger values of µ we are moving out of the "comfort zone" of these assumptions. Certain attacks that aren't readily feasible at small µ become easier at µ = 1. For example, Bennett et al. considered a special case of unambiguous state discrimination in [5] , splitting incoming pulses and measuring one portion in each basis. In some cases of 3 or more photon pulses, the measurement would result in both detectors firing in one basis and one firing in the other. When this happens, Eve can generate a new signal (close to Bob) without introducing any errors. For small values of µ, Bennett et al. concluded this attack was harmless. However, when µ = 1 and with perfect detectors for Eve, this attack becomes feasible with a fiber loss of about 18 dB, corresponding to approximately 90km of fiber at 0.2 dB/km attenuation. Another attack examined by Gisin et al. [1] involves improving the odds of intercept/resend attacks by splitting the beam, measuring each half in a different basis, and using detectors that can determine the number of photons in the signal. In certain operating regimes (small µ or short fiber length) this attack is no better than traditional intercept/resend, and we may use the same defense function. However by changing the defense function appropriately (i.e. granting Eve more information for each error bit received), one can in fact operate safely with a larger mean photon number. For the operating configuration analyzed in this paper, the result is still an optimal value of µ ≈ 1.1.
c For this analysis, we assume, following Gilbert and Hamrick [6] , that Bob is watching for anomalously high numbers of double detections (when both detectors click). Without this precaution, Eve would be able to send more than single-photon signals to Bob after successfully determining the state, and the attack would be feasible if the total attenuation, including Bob's receiver, was 18dB.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we offer a detailed analytic model for an experimental, fiber-based quantum cryptographic system, and a set of reasonable assumptions about Eve's current technical capabilities. We explicitly model total system behavior ranging from physical effects to the results of quantum cryptographic protocols such as error correction and privacy amplification. We then derive the optimal photon number (µ) for this system in a range of scenarios. One interesting result is that µ ≈ 1.1 is optimal for a wide range of realistic, fiber-based QKD systems; in fact, it provides about 10 times the distilled throughput of systems that employ a more conventional µ = 0.1, without any adverse affect on system security, given an explicit set of reasonable assumptions about Eve's current capabilities.
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